Plans and Manoeuvres
Soon after the formation of the allied organization, detailed plans were made to confront the Chinese at various fronts. 40 different leaders of various levels were appointed and assigned various responsibilities. 18 commanders were appointed to control the military movements. Assignments had been directed, locations to be scouted had been assigned, and monasteries, estates and provincial Dzongs to contact for assistance had been identified. A 27-point military law governing the conduct of the volunteers had been made.
While still in Dri-Guthang, the Tibetan government under pressure from the Chinese sent a four-member delegation including the governor of Lhokha with a large number of escorts to the South. Their repeated demand was the presence of General Gonpo Tashi at the provincial Dzong. Suspecting their repeated demand, General Gonpo Tashi and other top leaders refused to come to the Dzong but, instead, sent some sub-leaders to invite the representatives to the military headquarters. When they refused to come to the camp, the general sent more volunteers with sub-leaders to get whatever orders they had from the government or else to tell them to leave the place. So, finally, the delegation made their mission known through the sub-leaders. They demanded explicit answers as to why Gonpo Tashi, Jago Namgyal Dorjee and the people of Kham had left their homes and taken up arms. They wanted specific reasons for their actions and movements. The leaders gave their answers in writing and the delegation returned to Lhasa.
As soon as the government delegation returned to Lhasa, in accordance with the strategic plans, the headquarters was moved to Tsona with Jago Namgyal Dorjee in charge. Knowing that an official request required by the CIA for assistance to the resistance had been ignored by the Tibetan authorities and also knowing that it would take a long time, even if one would ever be forthcoming, General Andruk Gonpo Tashi, with a rather large division of selected men and horses under his command, started moving towards Shang Gaden Chokhor to get weapons and ammunition from the Tibetan government depot there. The rest of the volunteer troops were detailed in small groups of 50-100 to various places to scout and to ambush the Chinese movements. After quite a few encounters with the Chinese troops and several ambushes of Chinese convoys by the volunteers, the Lhokha area, south of Tsangpo (Brama Putra river) was free of Chinese presence except for Tsethang, where a Chinese garrison with underground tunnels was occupied by a Chinese army force of about 2,000 which could not be driven out despite repeated attacks by the volunteers.d World War. Later the volunteers obtained arms from Tibetan government depots, from airdrop by the CIA and from the Chinese army.
Meanwhile, General Gonpo Tashi's troops took all the arms and ammunition from Shang Gaden Chokhor and headed back south but, as a result of many serious encounters with Chinese soldiers who blocked all the routes, they could not penetrate through the Chinese army to cross Takdru Ka and return to the South, but had to move towards the North and further northeast from Nemo Shang. Hence the division became known as the Northern Regiment. They passed through Jang Yangpachen and Jang Namtso towards Jang Lharigo, then proceeded through Gyasho Bengal to Sarteng and Chakra Pelber in the area of Shota Lhosum. On their way the volunteers had to fight numerous battles and suffered heavy casualties. In a serious encounter with the Chinese army in Dre-Gung Mashung, General Gonpo Tashi was wounded by shrapnel and bullets and later in exile, despite months of medical treatment in England, he died of these old wounds in Darjeeling in September 1964. As the number of recruits increased, a few more commanders were named in Chakra Pelber, which then served as temporary headquarters of the Northern Regiment, and a number of scouting forces were sent from Pelber to Powo Tamo, Naksho Tsogu, Lho Dzong area and to Tsawa Pesho to recruit new volunteers, to scout and to obtain as many arms and as much ammunition as possible from government depots.